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Abstract— Modern applications of artificial neural networks
have yielded remarkable performance gains in a wide range
of tasks. However, recent studies have discovered that such
modelling strategy is vulnerable to Adversarial Examples, i.e.
examples with subtle perturbations often too small and imper-
ceptible to humans, but that can easily fool neural networks.
Defense techniques against adversarial examples have been
proposed, but ensuring robust performance against varying
or novel types of attacks remains an open problem. In this
work, we focus on the detection setting, in which case at-
tackers become identifiable while models remain vulnerable.
Particularly, we employ the decision layer of independently
trained models as features for posterior detection. The proposed
framework does not require any prior knowledge of adversarial
examples generation techniques, and can be directly employed
along with unmodified off-the-shelf models. Experiments on
the standard MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets deliver empirical
evidence that such detection approach generalizes well across
not only different adversarial examples generation methods but
also quality degradation attacks. Non-linear binary classifiers
trained on top of our proposed features can achieve a high
detection rate (> 90%) in a set of white-box attacks and
maintain such performance when tested against unseen attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite their major breakthroughs in solving challeng-
ing tasks, recent literature has shown that artificial neural
networks [1] can be vulnerable to deliberate perturbations,
which, when added to input examples, can lead to incor-
rect predictions with high confidence [2]. Such perturbed
examples are usually referred to as adversarial attacks, i.e.,
carefully crafted variations of genuine samples intentionally
modified so as to confuse or fool undefended models. For
the particular case of neural networks, minimal perturbations
are often required to yield effective adversarial attacks. As
such, adversarial samples are often imperceptible to humans,
but they result in model errors with high probability [3]. For
instance, an adversarial example as depicted in Fig. 1 can be
generated by adding some indiscernible perturbations into a
given image. The resultant adversarial image is misclassified
by the well-known convolutional classifier VGG16 [4], while
a human being can still classify it correctly without spotting
the deliberate added perturbations.
The vulnerability to adversarial attacks is severe since
artificial neural networks are now being deployed in real-
world applications. Moreover, such attacks have been shown
to be transferable [5]. More specifically, attackers targeting a
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indistinguishable from x but is classified incorrectly, i.e.
f(x0) 6= TrueClass Label; though the x is correctly classified
by the f , i.e., f(x) = TrueClass Label. In ot er words, a
learned deep learning model for a specific task is represented
as f : X ! Y , where X and Y respectively represent the
input sample and output spaces, and for a given test sample
x 2 X
Find x0
s.t. f(x) 6= f(x0)
 (x, x0) < ✏
(1)
where x, x0 2 X and ✏ is the parameter that sets the maximum
perturbation allowed.  (x, x0) is the difference between x and
x0 that depends on the specific data type of X . For instance,
in case of strings,  (x, x0) represents the difference between
two strings. Several algorithms have been recently proposed
to solve Eq. 1 as an optimization problem, which have been
detailed i subsequ nt subsections.
Adversarial attacks can be bifurcated into white-box (a.k.a.
model depende t) and black-box (a.k.a. model independent)
attacks. In the former category, the adversary has varying
degrees of knowledge of or access to the target model and
its parameters. Since, adversary have model?s knowledge,
they may be able to produce very powerful AE. Though
obtaining internal information of model is difficult, still white-
box AE is possible [29]. In the latter category, the adversary
knows nothing about the models except the predictions. The
black-box AEs are more realistic threat, and existing DNNs
are vulnerable regardless of their underlying structure [27].
Additionally, the AE attack takes one of two forms. A non-
targeted AE is an x0, which causes the target DNN model to
yield any incorrect output by reducing the probability of the
true class: f(x0) 6= y, where y is a true category or label with
highest probability [35]. A targeted AE is an x0 that causes
the target DNN model to predict a specific incorrect output
y0: f(x0) = y0, where y 6= y0 [33].
Although the AE generation methods are generally divided
into white and black-box attacks, we here have grouped them
into three categories: white-box AEs, black-box AEs, DNN-
based AEs that utilize another specific deep model to produce
AEs, and physical AEs.
A. White-Box AEs meth ds
1) L-BFGS At ack: Szegedy et al. [15] first introduced
AEs for DNNs. Authors proposed a AEs generation algorithm
based on L-BFGS method solving the general targeted prob-
lem:
min
x0
⌘ k (x, x0)k+ J✓(x0, y0) s.t. x0 2 [0, 1] (2)
where ⌘ is a constant that was estimated by line-searching
⌘ > 0 to compute approximate values of AEs, and J✓ is
loss function, e.g., cross-entropy. In [15], it was demonstrated
that the generated AEs may also be generalized not only
to different models but also to different training databases.
Authors argued that the success of AEs are owing to never
or hardly ever seen samples in the test databases. It is worth
mentioning that authors in [36] implemented L-BFGS Attack
with a binary search to find the optimal value for ⌘. Anyway,
the L-BFGS Attack is a time-consuming and impractical due
to use of an expensive linear search method to find the optimal
value. Fig. ?? shows an AE via L-BFGS Attack on ImageNet.
2) FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Method): To overcome
some limitations of L-BFGS Attack method, Goodfellow et al.
[13] devised a fast method, called Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM), to produce AEs. The FGSM technique only performs
one step gradient update along the direction of the sign of
gradient at each pixel. Specifically, the AEs are computed by:
x0 = x+ ✏sign(rxJ✓(x, y)) (3)
The perturbation in FGSM can be estimated using back-
propagation. In [13], authors argued that the linear part of the
high dimensional DNNs could not resist AEs; though linear
behaviour speeds up the training. Similarly, regularization
approaches in DNNs (e.g., dropout, pretraining, etc.) could
not improve the robustness of the models. Fig. 1a depicts an
AE using FGSM.
sign(rxJ(✓, x, y))
✏sign(rxJ(✓, x, y))
B. Black-Box AEs methods
C. Quality of Service (QoS)
III. CONCLUSION
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Fig. 1: An adversarial sample generated with Fast Gradient
Sign M thod (FGSM) in [2]. VGG16 [4] recognizes the clean
original image sample correctly with high confidence. When
a small perturbation is added to the image, the model predicts
incorrect label with similar high confidence.
particular model can be utilized to compromise other models
that h ve been designed for the same task, but with different
model architectures and/or training techniques. As such,
attackers could be designed targ ting a known surr gate
neural network and later applied to fool models practically
deployed. This vuln rability can be particularly threatening
in safety- and security-critical systems.
Following the description of adversarial attacks as first
introduced in the work of Szegedy t al. [6], several counter-
measure techniques have been proposed since; these can be
roughly categorized as defense or d tection methods. Defense
methods aim at improving the robustness of neural networks
against attacks, i.e., make it e ther compu ationally more
costly or require larger amounts of distortion imposed on
the original example so as to yield an effective a tack. Well
known examples of defense strategies include adversarial
training (i.e. including attacks in the training dataset) [2], as
well as training a new robust network to predict the outputs
o a prev ously rained model, which is also known as the
distillation method [7]. Detection approaches, in turn, focus
on being able to determine hether a given input is genuine
or not, while leaving the model undefended [8], [9].
In this paper, we focus on detection, as being able to
determine whether a system is under attack is a desired
property in several applications, such as user authentication,
access control, among many others. We exploit the fact
that two different neural networks presented with the same
attacker will make different mistakes and we propose to map
such mistake patterns into a final detection, as depicted by
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Fig. 2: Detection method using decision mismatch - con-
catenated outputs of pretrained Models 1 and 2 are used as
features for the detector.
Fig. 2. Empirical evidence is provided supporting the claim
that such strategy is effective in detecting several recently-
introduced attack strategies as well as quality degradation
attacks on two image classification tasks. More importantly,
generalization to unseen attack strategies is assessed and the
proposed detection method is shown to be able to attain
accuracy higher than 90.0% even when attack generation
strategies never seen by the detector are used at test time.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the
proposed approach is motivated and detailed in Section II.
Experimental setup is presented in Section III, results and
discussions in Section IV, and conclusions in Section V.
II. DECISION MISMATCH FOR ATTACKS DETECTION:
MOTIVATION AND METHOD
It is known that different models make different mistakes
when presented with the same attack inputs, and in order
to exploit that, Feinman et al. [8] use Dropout in “train
mode” and sample distinct models to predict the same input.
A divergence threshold is used to decide whether the input
is an attack or not. However, models obtained by simply
dropping out parameters of a given neural network share
most of their structure, hence yielding similar gradient-based
attacks. Using a similar strategy, in [10] subsequent outputs
of the same model obtained with an input sample before
and after decreasing each pixel’s color bit depth are used
as features for binary classification of attacks vs. clean
data. Once more, the same model is used for predictions of
gradient-based attacks, which exploit the model structure for
building attacks. Based on this, we argue that mismatching
of predictions will be maximized when the model structure is
relevantly distinct. We thus propose to perform classification
with two independently trained models and use their softmax
output as features for a separate binary classifier. Intuitively,
the consistency of the outputs provided by the two systems
will be an indicator of clean samples, while a mismatch will
indicate potential attacks. Employing models with different
architectures will make gradient-based attacks have different
effects on each model, which is exactly what we intend to
leverage in order to spot attacks.
The proposed approach is illustrated in Fig. 2. Two
independently trained multi-class classifiers (models 1 and
2) receive the same input, and their concatenated outputs
are used as features by a binary classifier that performs
classification of authentic vs. attack inputs. The requirements
for model 1 and 2 are matching performance on the task at
hand and significant structural differences. The detector can
be any binary classifier of choice. The proposed approach
also presents benefits in terms of cost since only two pre-
dictions are required at test time as opposed to e.g., [8],
which needed a relatively large number of predictions for
divergence evaluation. Additionally, no extra processing is
required on the tested samples, as was the case of [10]. At
train time our method requires the training of two different
models performing the same task.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Model/detector training
We perform experiments on the MNIST [11] and
CIFAR10 [12] datasets. MNIST contains 28x28 ten-
class grayscale images representing the digits from 0
to 9. CIFAR10 is a ten-class dataset with 32x32 color
images consisting of animals and vehicles. In both cases,
50,000/10,000 training/testing images are available. Two
classifiers are trained in advance on each dataset (models 1
and 2 in Fig. 2). Neural networks were implemented using
Pytorch1 [13], while binary classifiers use Scikit learn [14].
The code to reproduce the experiments and results will be
available on GitHub 2 upon acceptance.
Target models: In the case of MNIST, models 1 and
2 were selected as convolutional (CNN) and fully connected
(MLP) neural networks, respectively. Dropout regularization
was employed in both models [15]. The architectures are
described in more details as follows:
• CNN: conv(5x5, 10)→ maxpool(2x2)→ conv(5x5, 20)
→ maxpool(2x2)→ linear(350, 50)→ dropout(0.5)→
linear(50, 10) → softmax.
• MLP: linear(784, 320) → dropout(0.5) → linear(320,
50)→ dropout(0.5) → linear(50, 10)→ softmax
All activation functions were set to ReLU. Training was
performed with Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) using
a fixed learning rate of 0.01 and mini-batches of size 64.
Training was executed for 10 epochs.
In the case of CIFAR10, we selected the widely used con-
volutional neural networks VGG16 and ResNet50 [16], [17]
as model 1 and 2 respectively. The models were trained from
scratch using SGD. The learning rate was scheduled to start
at 0.1 and decay by a factor of 1/10 after 10 epochs with no
improvement on the validation set accuracy. Momentum and
L2 regularization were employed with respective coefficients
set to 0.9 and 0.0005. Performance of the models for both
datasets are presented in Table I.
Training the attack detector: In order to train the binary
classifier (attack detector), subsets containing 10,000 images
of the train partition of both MNIST and CIFAR10 were
randomly sampled. We thus iterate over each such images
and randomly decide whether it will be either included in
1https://pytorch.org/
2https://github.com/joaomonteirof
TABLE I: Performance on test data of the selected models.
Dataset Model Test Accuracy (%)
MNIST CNN 97.57MLP 96.62
CIFAR10 VGG 92.50ResNet 92.04
the detector training data as a clean sample, in which case
it receives a label of 0, or an attack will be generated on
top of it. In this case, the sample will be included in the
dataset with a label of 1. To generate attacks, one of the two
models is randomly selected to be attacked, which means
that all attacks considered are white-box for one of the
targeted models and black-box with respect to the other.
Moreover, we highlight that all attacks are generated with
a variable budget in terms of how far from the original
image an attack can be, as opposed to simply keeping a
fixed budget across all examples, i.e. the distortion level is
gradually increased up until the model makes a mistake, and
this is independently repeated for each image. This is done
so as to find effective attacks as close as possible to their
original images, which will in turn be more difficult to detect.
If the maximum distortion budget is used and a mistake is
not made by the model, or if the model wrongly predicts
a given image without any distortion, its clean version is
included in the dataset with a label of 0. Four recently
introduced gradient-based attack strategies were evaluated
in this study, namely FGSM [2], IGSM [18], JSMA [19],
and DeepFool [3]. Moreover, quality degradation attacks
were also considered, consisting of Gaussian Blur, Gaussian
Noise, and Salt and Pepper. For reproducibility, all attacks
were implemented using the open source tool Foolbox [20].
In summary, by the end of the described process we
obtained 7 independent datasets for each of MNIST and
CIFAR10, each of those containing 10,000 samples being
approximately 50% attacks that were generated using either
model 1 or 2. Such datasets are then used for training and
evaluation of binary classifiers trained to classify data sam-
ples into genuine/attackers. Examples of above mentioned
attacks are shown in Fig. 3.
Clean Gaussian Noise
Gaussian 
Blur
Salt and 
PepperFGSM IGSM JSMA DeepFool
Fig. 3: Examples of different attack strategies considered.
B. Adversarial examples generation
We now briefly describe the standard adversarial attack
generation methods utilized in the experiments. Adversarial
attacks to deep learning based systems can be either black-
box or white-box, where the adversary, respectively, does
not have and has knowledge of the model architecture,
parameters and its training data. In addition, the attacks
could be targeted and non-targeted, that aim to misguide
deep neural networks to a specific class and arbitrary class
except the correct one, respectively. In this work, we have
used white-box non-targeted adversarial examples.
Let f : Rn → {1, ...,K} be an artificial neural network
trained for multi-class classification, i.e., to map a given
input x ∈ R to a class label l ∈ {1, ...,K} which might
or might not correspond to x’s true class label y, where K
is the number of classes. Generating an adversarial attack
can be thus defined as the minimization problem of finding
an adversary xadv within a p-norm ball centered in x which
will yield an incorrect prediction, i.e. f(xadv) = ladv 6= y,
or, formally:
min
xadv
||xadv − x||p
s.t. f(x) = y
f(xadv) 6= y.
(1)
Several strategies were proposed to compute effective
attackers. In the following, we provide a brief description
of the attack strategies considered in our evaluation.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). FGSM [2]
computes adversarial attacks by perturbing each pixel of a
clean sample x by  on the direction of the gradient of the
training loss J (usually the categorical cross-entropy) given
the true label y with respect to the input:
xadv = x+  · sign[∇xJ(x, y)]. (2)
In this case,  corresponds to the attack budget, i.e. the
allowed distortion on x to yield xadv . A high  will increase
the attacker’s success rate, but it will be easier to detect.
Iterative Gradient Sign Method (IGSM). IGSM [18]
corresponds to iteratively repeating FGSM with a small .
The attack budget now depends on both  and the number of
iterations. xadv at iteration i will be given by, for xadv0 = x:
xadvi = x
adv
i−1 +  · sign[∇xadvi−1J(x
adv
i−1, y)]. (3)
Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA). In JSMA [19],
the goal is to determine which pixels yield higher variations
on the outputs after perturbed. The outputs’ Jacobian with
respect to inputs is thus computed, and the perturbed value
of each pixel p of a given input x belonging to class y, given
the model f and target class t, will then be padv = p if
∂ft(x)
∂p
< 0 or
∑
j 6=t
∂fy(x)
∂p
> 0. (4)
Otherwise,
padv = p+
∂ft(x)
∂p
|
∑
j 6=t
∂fy(x)
∂p
|. (5)
DeepFool. For the binary case, i.e. K=2, DeepFool [3]
attacks are obtained by computing a linear approximation
of the decision boundary, and then performing a step in its
orthogonal direction, with the aim of finding the smallest
perturbation yielding a change in the prediction given by the
targeted model. The perturbation ri = xadvi − x at iteration
i will be given by:
ri = − f(xi)||∇f(xi)||22
∇f(xi), (6)
and xadvi+1 = x
adv
i + ri. Iterative updates of x
adv
i stop when
f(xadvi+1) 6= f(xadvi ). For K > 2, a one-vs-all approach is
employed and the direction corresponding to the minimum
||ri||2 given each decision boundary is thus used for
perturbing xadvi .
Quality degradation attacks. In addition to the
aforementioned methods, we also produced adversarial
attacks using quality perturbations, i.e., additive Gaussian
noise, salt and pepper noise, and Gaussian blur were
employed, and a line-search was performed to estimate
minimal perturbations yielding a change in a given model’s
prediction.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We performed two main experiments aimed at evaluating:
(a) the detection performance of the proposed approach
when training and testing are performed using the same
attack strategy; and (b) the generalization capability of the
proposed approach by using data generated with a particular
attack strategy for training and a different one for testing the
detector.
A. Validation
Prior to proceeding to main experiments results, we an-
alyze the performance of the studied attacks and budget
selection strategies. Ideally, powerful attacks will be close
to their original images, and even so will be able to fool the
target models. In Table II, the mean squared error (MSE)
with respect to the original example is employed to measure
the average distance between attacks and genuine images
over random samples of size 500 from both datasets. The
success rate of each attack, i.e. which fraction of the 500
images actually yielded a prediction mistake, is also reported.
In general, gradient-based methods yielded stronger at-
tacks as the MSE of samples obtained with it is smaller for
both MNIST and CIFAR. This fact is expected, as additive
perturbation strategies methods do not directly exploit model
structures to yield refined attacks. DeepFool is the strongest
attack strategy evaluated on MNIST since its MSE is at least
one order of magnitude lower than the other methods. For
TABLE II: Performance of different attacks evaluated in
terms of the average MSE for 500 images and their success
rate.
Attack MSE Success Rate (%)MNIST CIFAR10 MNIST CIFAR10
FGSM 2.13E-02 1.91E-03 100.0 100.0
IGSM 1.07E-02 3.34E-05 100.0 100.0
JSMA 1.24E-02 2.07E-04 95.6 100.0
DeepFool 6.17E-03 1.00E-04 100.0 99.8
Gaussian blur 4.35E-02 3.04E-03 90.2 93.8
Gaussian noise 5.67E-02 4.90E-03 67.4 100.0
Salt and pepper 1.23E-01 2.13E-03 100.0 100.0
TABLE III: SVM performance for (MNIST / CIFAR10)
attacks detection using 10-fold cross-validation. Each exper-
iment was performed with an independent random subset of
the train data containing 10,000 images.
Accuracy F1 AUC
FGSM 0.93 / 0.93 0.92 / 0.93 0.93 / 0.93
IGSM 0.91 / 0.93 0.91 / 0.93 0.91 / 0.93
JSMA 0.92 / 0.93 0.92 / 0.92 0.92 / 0.93
DeepFool 0.92 / 0.91 0.91 / 0.90 0.92 / 0.91
Gaussian blur 0.98 / 0.97 0.98 / 0.97 0.98 / 0.97
Gaussian noise 0.96 / 0.95 0.97 / 0.95 0.96 / 0.95
Salt and pepper 0.93 / 0.94 0.93 / 0.94 0.93 / 0.94
CIFAR10, IGSM is the best performer. FGSM is the weakest
strategy among gradient-based attacks.
Furthermore, to better visualize how discriminable attacks
are when compared to clean samples, we show the low
rank t-SNE embeddings [21] of the raw images and their
representations with our proposed features in Fig. 4. Plots
are generated under DeepFool attacks on CIFAR10. One can
clearly notice that the representation in the proposed space
of features makes attacks and clean samples separable.
B. Attack detection performance
To evaluate the proposed detection approach, we trained
a detector on top of the representations obtained with pre-
trained models using the previously described approach, i.e.
concatenating the softmax layer outputs given by trained
models. The binary classifier used here was a Support Vector
Machine (SVM) with RBF kernel. Accuracy, F1 score,
accounting for precision and sensitivity simultaneously, and
area under ROC curve (AUC) were analyzed as performance
metrics. Evaluation of metrics was performed under 10-
fold cross-validation, and results are shown in Table III
TABLE IV: Detection rate of attackers - Results are pre-
sented as (MNIST / CIFAR10). For MNIST, the proposed
approach obtained detection rates on par with the Feature
Squeezing (FS) and ensemble benchmarks.
FS [10] Ensemble [22] Proposed
FGSM 1.000 / 0.208 0.998 / 0.998 0.930 / 0.930
IGSM 0.979 / 0.550 0.997 / 0.488 0.920 / 0.940
JSMA 1.000 / 0.885 – / – 0.930 / 0.970
DeepFool – / 0.774 0.450 / 0.426 0.910 / 0.910
(a) Raw images (b) Features for independent models
’
Fig. 4: (a) Two dimensional t-SNE embeddings of raw images; (b) Features for independently trained model. Blue dots are
authentic samples and red dots are attacks generated with DeepFool on 10,000 samples from CIFAR10. Attacks and clean
data are indistinguishable for the case of raw images. Representations in the feature space make attacks and clean samples
discriminable. Each blue cluster in the feature space corresponds to a particular class.
for MNIST and CIFAR10. As can be seen, scores are
consistently higher than 90%.
In Table IV, in turn, we provide an evaluation of our ap-
proach compared with results presented by Feature Squeez-
ing (FS) [10] and ensemble methods [22] in terms of detec-
tion rate or sensitivity, i.e., the fraction of attacks which were
correctly classified by the binary classifier. Even though other
methods present a higher sensitivity in the case of attack
strategies such as FGSM and IGSM on MNIST, the proposed
approach outperforms the benchmarks in more challenging
cases, such as DeepFool or other attacks on CIFAR10,
not showing any relevant performance degradation across
methods. In the case of CIFAR10, our method outperformed
the comparative techniques in 3 out of 4 attacks. We attribute
the higher performance in those cases to the fact that the
mismatch between the outputs of models 1 and 2 is higher
for higher dimensional data and more effective attackers, and
the detectors benefit from such higher mismatch.
1) Generalization to unseen attacks: The second exper-
iment was performed with the goal of verifying whether
a detector trained on a particular attack strategy is able
to detect other types of attacks, which is interesting from
practical perspective, since in a real-world system, the nature
of attackers is unknown, thus generalization across varying
attack generation strategies arises as an important property
of detection and defense schemes. In order to do so, we used
data from a particular attacker for training the binary classi-
fiers and evaluated their accuracy on different attack data. All
possible pairs of attacks were evaluated under this scheme
and the accuracies obtained are presented in Figures 5 and 6
for MNIST and CIFAR10, respectively. Results indicate that
the proposed approach presents high detection accuracy even
when the detector is tested against unseen attacks. Detectors
trained on JSMA on MNIST are the ones that perform
Test
FGSM IGSM JSMA DeepFool
FGSM - 0.90 0.78 0.87 0.94 0.95 0.93
IGSM 0.92 - 0.87 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.92
JSMA 0.91 0.91 - 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.91
Tr
ai
n
DeepFool 0.91 0.91 0.89 - 0.91 0.92 0.91
0.66 0.59 0.55 0.54 - 0.83 0.70
0.89 0.80 0.62 0.72 0.96 - 0.90
0.91 0.87 0.76 0.84 0.94 0.95 -
Gaussian
Blur
Gaussian
Noise
Salt And
Pepper
Gaussian
Blur
Gaussian
Noise
Salt And
Pepper
Fig. 5: Generalization performance for MNIST of a SVM
detector when trained in the attacks on the row and evaluated
on the attacks on the columns. Values in the table indicate
test accuracy - the higher the better.
best on different attacks. The same behavior appears on
CIFAR10 for DeepFool. Interestingly, even though detectors
trained on quality degradation attacks present a much lower
generalization capacity, detectors trained on simple attacks
such as salt and pepper noise can still achieve surprisingly
high accuracies on refined attacks such as DeepFool and
JSMA.
Test
FGSM IGSM JSMA DeepFool
FGSM - 0.92 0.93 0.89 0.93 0.94 0.92
IGSM 0.92 - 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.92
JSMA 0.92 0.92 - 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.91
Tr
ai
n
DeepFool 0.92 0.92 0.92 - 0.91 0.92 0.91
0.80 0.72 0.73 0.67 - 0.81 0.81
0.85 0.81 0.77 0.78 0.91 - 0.78
0.80 0.80 0.79 0.72 0.93 0.83 -
Gaussian
Blur
Gaussian
Noise
Salt And
Pepper
Gaussian
Blur
Gaussian
Noise
Salt And
Pepper
Fig. 6: Generalization performance for CIFAR10 of a SVM
detector when trained in the attacks on the row and evaluated
on the attacks on the columns. Values in the table indicate
test accuracy - the higher the better.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we evaluated a novel approach to perform
detection of adversarial attacks against artificial neural net-
works. To do so, the softmax layer outputs of two previously
trained multi-class models are used as features for binary
classification of attacks versus clean samples. Experiments
presented provide empirical evidence that not only the space
defined by the concatenated outputs of distinct pre-trained
models is separable in terms of genuine examples and
attacks, but more importantly that generalization to unseen
attacking methods is achieved. Such findings are important,
as new attack strategies can be conceived to outperform
detection or defense methods that are only able to over-
come attacks generated by strategies known in advance. One
shortcoming of the proposed approach lies in the fact that it
requires two models to be trained to perform the same task,
which will incur cost overhead at test time. Nevertheless, this
redundancy pays off in terms of added robustness, and can
be also leveraged as an ensemble to improve performance
on the task of interest when clean samples are given.
For future work, we intend to scale this approach to
classification tasks involving a higher number of classes.
Moreover, even though the unconstrained testbed employed
here - i.e. untargeted attacks along with white-box model
dependent distortions - yields the most subtle and hence dif-
ficult to detect adversarial examples, evaluating the proposed
method on black-box and targeted attacks is a complemen-
tary analysis to be done.
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